JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Introduction
The correspondence between electoral systems and party systems has generated an enormous amount of literature.
1 While each element may influence the other, most discussions focus on how institutional rules influence patterns of party competition. The assumption that alterations in the former automatically lead to changes in the latter has in part motivated the overhauling of long-established electoral rules in Italy, New Zealand, Willy Jou is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. He would like to thank the Center for Asian Studies at the University of California, Irvine, for funding part of this research, and the anonymous reviewer for detailed comments and suggestions. Email: <jouw@uci.edu>.
and Japan in the early 1990s, 2 and in Italy again in 2005. These events not only brought renewed attention to the topic of choosing electoral systems 3 but also allow empirical testing of theoretical postulates on consequences of electoral reform for party system change.
However, difficulties arise in making cross-national comparisons of how electoral rule changes shape subsequent party system development. This is because the reforms enumerated above, as well as others enacted during recent decades, do not entail changes both from and to the same systems. Thus, it is often impossible to disentangle the effects of electoral reform from country-specific political dynamics when drawing a causal arrow from institutional to party system change. A rare exception involves the cases of Japan and Taiwan, both of which abandoned the time-honored single nontransferable vote (SNTv) in favor of a mixed parallel (also known as mixedmember majoritarian or mixed superposition) system. 4 A comparative study of these two countries thus permits one to distinguish features of party and voter behavior amenable to electoral reform from those that are less readily modified because of idiosyncratic local conditions.
In examining party system change in Japan and Taiwan, this study focuses on two related aspects: similarities in trends toward two-party competition at both national and district levels, and differences in how quickly bipolar equilibrium is attained in each country. Pre-and post-reform election results are presented to demonstrate that while convergence toward a two-party system is unmistakable in both Japan and Taiwan, this process has occurred much more rapidly in the latter. Several possible explanations for this difference are discussed, including issue cleavages, constitutional structure (parliamentary versus presidential system), consistency of rules for national and sub-national elections, and distinctive features contained in the reforms enacted in each country.
This study is organized as follows: the next sections briefly describe electoral reform in Japan and Taiwan, and review literature concerning its 4. Only the House of representatives in Japan, the more powerful chamber of the country's bicameral Parliament, is discussed in this paper. Elections in Taiwan refer to the Legislative yuan.
anticipated repercussions. Indicators derived from election results under both old and new rules are then presented, including indices of fragmentation and disproportionality. Next, constituency results are analyzed to explore trends in party system change at the district level. Some hypotheses explaining contrasts in patterns of party competition observed in the two countries are probed before concluding remarks.
New Electoral Systems in Japan and Taiwan
The SNTv approach was used to choose democratically elected legislatures in Japan from 1947 to 1993, and in Taiwan from 1992 to 2004 . 5 Under this system, each district elected two to six members in Japan, and one to 16 members in Taiwan. 6 Where a district elects three or more representatives, a party seeking a parliamentary majority must run multiple candidates, giving rise to intra-party competition and candidate-centered campaigns. This is because aspiring members of Parliament (MPs) unable to rely on their party labels alone resorted to cultivating personal votes instead. Since SNTv tends to achieve "semi-proportional" seat distributions, 7 small parties could acquire representation and had little incentive for cooperation. As for larger parties, their seat share depended not only on the number of votes garnered but also on the number of candidates nominated in each district and the distribution of votes among them. 8 reed's assessment that SNTv promoted "issue-free elections, political corruption, and one-party dominance" 9 in Japan was equally applicable to Taiwan.
The sequence of events leading to the enactment of electoral reform in Japan and the strategic considerations that motivated proponents of reform are already well documented;
10 Lin describes similar processes and incentives 5. SNTv was also used in Japan before World War Two, and during decades of authoritarian rule in Taiwan, though election outcomes were heavily influenced by government intervention.
6. About one-fifth of seats were allocated under proportional representation (Pr) under the old system in Taiwan, but voters did not cast a separate ballot for district candidates and party lists. Instead, Pr seats were filled in proportion to votes cast for district candidates nominated by each party. 11 Suffice it to summarize here key features of the new system. In Japan, the legislature comprises 300 single-member districts (SMDs) and 200 (later reduced to 180) seats allocated through Pr in 11 regional blocs. 12 In Taiwan, there are 73 SMDs and 34 Pr seats in a single nationwide constituency, as well as six seats reserved for indigenous populations. 13 In both countries, voters cast separate SMD and Pr ballots, and seat allocation under each component is independent of the other. Parties in Japan must receive at least 2% of votes in each regional bloc to gain Pr seats, while the threshold in the nationwide Pr district in Taiwan is markedly higher at 5%.
Although this difference may have a bearing on the chances of small parties to enter Parliament, in practice the 2% threshold in Japan is meaningless, because the effective threshold 14 in even the bloc with the largest number of seats exceeds this legal minimum. This means that a party obtaining slightly above 2% of Pr votes would still be unable to secure a seat. At present the average Pr bloc magnitude is 16.36, which translates into an effective threshold of 4.3%. Small parties are disadvantaged by the use of regional blocs rather than a nationwide constituency as the unit of Pr seat distribution. In contrast, the 5% threshold in Taiwan considerably exceeds the effective threshold of 2.1%, thus constituting a real hurdle for small party representation.
It comes as no surprise that large and small parties adopted opposite stances toward electoral reform. The long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan twice attempted to push through a first-past-the-post (FPTP) system. Even after it was temporarily dislodged from power, the LDP pushed to increase the percentage of SMDs under the new mixed system, when negotiating with the new coalition government. Similarly, in Taiwan the incumbent Nationalist Party (Kuomintang/Guomindang, KMT) proposed a mixed system with a majority of seats allocated by FPTP, while small parties preferred a fully proportional system. The most instructive 12. With district magnitude ranging from seven to 33 seats. 13. Two three-member districts, one each for highland and lowland aborigines. These seats are excluded from the discussion below because their allocation mechanism differs from both SMDs and Pr.
14. Effective threshold = 75%/(m + 1); m = district magnitude. case may be that of Komeito (Clean Government Party) in Japan: when it was part of the New Frontier Party (NFP), a large party that encompassed both opposition members and LDP defectors, it supported a greater emphasis on the FPTP component of the mixed system. But after the disintegration of the NFP left Komeito on its own, it began to advocate a return to the old SNTv system and, failing this, vigorously opposed reducing the number of seats allocated by Pr.
Consequences for Patterns of Party Competition: Some Predictions
Although Duverger's proposition that "the simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two party system" comes closer than most hypotheses in the social sciences to attaining the status of a law, 15 a mixed system juxtaposing SMD and Pr components mitigates the strength of this causal relationship. The reason is that the mechanical effect Duverger envisages would be "less punishing to marginal parties than the mechanical effect in standard SMD systems with a plurality rule." 16 Instead of recognizing the futility of running SMD candidates under an FPTP system and either giving up or seeking cooperation with a large party, small parties in a mixed system retain an incentive to nominate district candidates in order to boost their vote share in the Pr component. In other words, the existence of two tiers in the electoral system links party incentives and strategies in one component to the other, even when seat distribution mechanisms are unlinked.
With this "contamination effect" in mind, most scholars analyzing the impact of electoral reform in Japan do not expect movement toward a full-fledged two-party system. For example, Shiratori predicts that while the SMD component would facilitate bipolar contests, the Pr tier could lead to moderate multi-party competition. 17 Kohno forecasts that "Duverger's law is not going to work and a two-party system is unlikely to emerge," and that the new electoral rules would instead produce coalition 15 governments where small parties are needed to form parliamentary majorities. 18 regarding the number of parties, Thies believes that "the system should continue to produce two large parties and a few small ones," 19 while McKean and Scheiner foresee "three conservative-to-centrist parties" along with the continued presence of the Japanese Community Party (JCP). 20 Even when one narrows the discussion to SMDs alone, Cox and Schoppa report that the effective number of electoral parties (known in political science as ENEP) in SMDs does not decrease as Duverger's law predicts, but rather remains relatively stable over time. The reason, they argue, is because "under mixed rules, Duverger's incentives do not operate strongly enough to move ENEP numbers below the mid-2.0 range." 21 The same logic leads Wada to conclude that "Japan will never have a two-party system even in the single-member district with plurality part" because small parties continue to run in SMD races, resulting in "a terribly distorted multi-party system." 22 In contrast, reed identifies "a clear trend toward districts featuring bipolar competition between one representative of the governing coalition and one representative of the opposition," even though "movement towards a two-party system at the national level has been halting at best" because of the main opposition Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) difficulty in presenting itself as a credible alternative government in its early years. 23 Another possible development is the perpetuation of patterns of party competition under the previous system, notwithstanding alterations in electoral rules. The prospect that "the new electoral system will reinforce the unity and the electoral strength of the LDP while leaving its opposition weak and divided"
24 cannot be ruled out. This is not because party actors are impervious to institutional changes but because such changes may generate incentives and strategies unforeseen by, and operating contrary to the expectations of, the designers of electoral reform. The continuation of factions within the LDP is a clear example of organizational persistence and adaptation in the face of changes in the rules of the game. 25 Although the Taiwanese case has received less scholarly attention, one can reasonably conjecture on the basis of the above discussion that a contamination effect would also be in evidence. At the same time, the absence of regional Pr blocs and a dual candidacy provision may mean fewer closely contested SMDs; the higher legal threshold in Taiwan hampers small parties to a greater extent than in Japan. Having a nationwide Pr bloc without allowance for dual candidacies may suppress the effective number of elective parties, while a high threshold does the same for the effective number of parliamentary parties. 26 These trends may in turn lead not only to a more consolidated two-party system but even render one-party dominance more likely. In this case, though, the identity of the dominant party is less clear, because both the KMT and its main opponent, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), have obtained popular vote majorities before.
Moving toward a Two-Party System? Some National Trends
Effective Number of Parties
The contours of a party system are defined by the number of parties. Instead of merely counting how many parties obtain parliamentary representation, however, political scientists generally take party size into account and calculate the effective number of parties (ENP). 27 The first column of Table 1 reports this figure for all elections in Japan and Taiwan under the new mixed system, along with a number of elections conducted under SNTv to provide a basis for comparison. In both countries, one notes a large decrease in ENP between the last pre-reform and the first postreform elections, affirming that a mixed system with a majority of seats allocated by FPTP has a significant impact in reducing the number of parliamentary parties. At the same time, it is noteworthy that whereas the decline in legislative fragmentation in Japan only brought ENP down to figures resembling those seen in the 1980s, in Taiwan post-reform ENP was considerably lower than at any point during the pre-reform decade.
One should also observe that in accord with forecasts reported in the previous section, ENP in Japan shows a declining trend after initial fluctuation (reflecting an unstable party system that saw a number of parties splitting and merging throughout the 1990s), but never reaches as low as two. This implies that although small parties cannot thrive as they did under the old system, they are still able to maintain a presence in the legislature by relying on the new system's Pr component. The case of Taiwan points to the opposite conclusion, suggesting not only that small parties have scarce room for survival in the face of a strong majoritarian imperative but also that instead of two-party competition, one may be observing a scenario of one-party dominance. Explanations for these contrasting developments will be examined below. ENP reveals the degree of parliamentary fragmentation but not how seats are distributed among parties. To assess whether electoral reform has encouraged the development of a two-party system, the second column of Table 1 displays the combined seat share of the two largest parties after each election. This percentage increased markedly between the last SNTv election and the first one conducted under the parallel mixed system. But whereas similar levels of large-party strength were seen in Japan as late as 1990, in Taiwan the degree of parliamentary dominance by the two main parties is unprecedented since democratic elections were first held in 1992. These trends provide further evidence of evolution toward a two-party system in both countries, but once again suggest that electoral reform has a more drastic impact in squeezing out small parties in Taiwan. rather than depending solely on Pr seats (including fielding hopeless SMD candidates in order to boost the Pr vote), another means of small party adaptation involves alliance with large parties. Small parties can ensure both electoral survival and potential policy influence through these arrangements, and large parties may leave a number of SMDs open to allow their junior partners a free run in return for extra support in most other districts. Such pacts become all the more important if a large party falls short of a parliamentary majority and needs support from small parties to pass legislation. This explains the LDP's offer to form governing coalitions with a series of small parties, most notably (and so far enduringly) with Komeito. In the Taiwanese election of 2008, the KMT even invited small-party candidates to run under its label. When one counts not only the two largest parties but also their allies, figures in the second column of Table 1 reach even higher proportions (shown in parentheses).
Having observed movement toward a two-party system in both Japan and (especially) Taiwan following electoral reform, the next logical step is to examine whether such a trend is confined to the parliamentary level or reflects similar developments at the electoral level as well. In other words, to what degree has electoral reform generated a psychological effect among party elites and ordinary voters to supplement the mechanical effect translating votes into seats? Keeping in mind that the mixed parallel system is composed of two independent parts, it makes sense to discuss the effect of the SMD and Pr components separately. Table 2 gives the ENP at both the elective and parliamentary levels for the same elections as shown in Table 1 , with figures for single member districts and Pr blocs listed separately. Understandably, correspondence between the two ENP figures is much greater in the Pr component than in SMDs. The fact that ENP is always significantly higher in the Pr portion even at the elective level suggests both that many voters have been able to distinguish between the two components of the new system from the start, and that small parties either refrained from fielding SMD candidates or received significantly lower vote shares in district races compared with their party list votes.
More interestingly, when the post-reform figures shown in Table 1 are  disaggregated in Table 2 , it is clear that evolution toward a two-party system in Japan is primarily a phenomenon in SMDs only, as Duverger's law predicts. ENP at the parliamentary level has remained relatively stable in 28 one can expect a further decrease in elective ENP (though with little impact at the parliamentary level, because the JCP has not won any district races since 1996). In contrast, parliamentary ENP has not shown a consistent decrease (in fact rising dramatically in 2000 before dropping back in the following election), and there is little reason to expect this figure to fall much below 3.0 barring a major party realignment.
The introduction of a mixed parallel system in Taiwan also resulted in a significant reduction in ENP under the SMD component at both elective and parliamentary levels. Unlike Japan, the same holds true for the Pr portion. Moreover, the Pr component in Taiwan yields a result much less proportional than in Japan, at the expense of small parties. That small parties in Taiwan face greater bipolarizing pressures can be surmised by comparing the elective ENP in 2004 with that under the Pr portion in 2008: even where voters had an incentive to cast their ballots sincerely, they mostly flocked to the two large parties, abandoning a number of established minor parties and a host of new ones. Perhaps foreseeing this development, and certainly bearing the 5% threshold in mind, one of the small parties, the People First Party (PFP), did not even attempt to present its own list, opting instead to negotiate with the KMT and have its candidates run under the latter's label. Disproportionality results reported above lead appropriately to a discussion about disproportiona lity, namely, the disparity between parties' vote and seat shares. As figures for pre-reform elections in Table 2 suggest, SNTv produced relatively proportional results when translating votes into seats. Advocates of electoral reform no doubt fully recognized that a mixed parallel system, especially with a majority of seats allocated by FPTP, would increase disproportionality. This was perceived not as a shortcoming but rather as a welcome antidote to party fragmentation and, at least in the case of Japan, a change that would encourage prospects of government alternation under a two-party system (this had already taken place in Taiwan). Table 3 , with separate figures listed for the SMD and Pr portions under the new system. Assuming relatively even distribution of party support across the country, the higher the number of closely fought SMD contests, the more proportional the outcome is likely to be. Empirically, when the main opposition DPJ scored its best performance against the LDP in 2003, one sees lower disproportiona lity in the SMD component, whereas the LDP landslide of 2005 raised disproportion ality to an unprecedented level. The same phenomenon is seen in the high SMD disproportionality in Taiwan in 2008, when the KMT won an overwhelming victory. In contrast to figures in previous tables, one detects no obvious post-reform trend in Japan with regard to SMD disproportionality. The only unmistakable change involves the significant 29. Using the formula proposed in Michael Gallagher, "Proportionality, Disproportionality, and Electoral Systems," Electoral Studies 10:1 (March 1991), pp. 33-51. AS4905_02_Jou.indd 770 10/13/09 4:49:58 PM decline in proportionality with the introduction of the mixed parallel system in both countries. Of greater interest are disproportionality indices in the Pr segment, where one notes a steady rise over the past several elections in Japan, although even the highest level reached so far (2005) remains below figures obtained under SNTv. This suggests that small parties are increasingly disadvantaged even in a component of the system designed to ensure their continued viability. While allocation of Pr seats in a single, nationwide Pr constituency would ensure greater proportionality, and hence brighter prospects for small parties, than 11 regional blocs, this has been a fixed feature since the introduction of the new system and cannot account for variation in disproportionality over the past four elections. One possible explanation is that the Pr vote share of some small parties has fallen to just below the effective threshold in a number of regional blocs.
In contrast, disproportionality in the Pr segment in Taiwan considerably exceeds both equivalent indicators in Japan and figures for SNTv elections. This reaffirms the finding that whereas small parties in Japan are able to maintain their presence under the new system through Pr lists, those in Taiwan have not been afforded similar opportunities. The disparity derives from both the smaller number of Pr seats and the 5% threshold imposed in Taiwan. The more small parties there are that fail to clear this hurdle, the greater the disproportionality. In the face of electoral oblivion, small parties in Taiwan have a far stronger incentive than their Japanese counterparts to seek alliance or merger with large parties. This was precisely the course taken by the PFP, which subordinated itself under the KMT banner. Ironically, greater proportionality would result only if other minor parties follow suit (or exit the electoral stage).
Moving toward a Two-Party System? District-Level Indicators
Having examined party system changes at the national level, attention now turns to exploring patterns of party competition in individual constituencies to further compare and contrast movement toward a two-party system in Japan and Taiwan. This section focuses on SMDs, where the clearest evidence of such a trend is expected. One can demonstrate the emergence and consolidation of a two-party system through the following characteristics, discussed in detail below: two main parties fielding nominees in a higher number of districts, declining total and effective number of candidates per district, increasing presence and competitiveness of the top two parties' nominees in each district, and diminishing instances of minor party and independent victories in SMD contests.
Presence of Top Two National Parties in SMDs
The average number of candidates per district for all elections conducted under the new system is listed in the first column of Table 4 . In order to discount the impact of also-rans, the effective number of candidates is also reported, employing the method used for ENP above. A progressive decline in both indicators is readily observable in Japan, with a particularly sharp drop between 2000 and 2003, reflecting not only the marginalization of some small parties but also the merger between the DPJ and Liberal Party that established the former as the only alternative governing party to the LDP. If one disregards the perennial communist standardbearers, both the mean and the effective number of candidates per district are app roach ing 2.0. Interestingly, a breakdown of SMDs by population density 30 reveals that the drop in the effective number of candidates is largely an urban phenomenon: it has decreased by more than 1 in metropolitan districts but hardly changed at all in rural areas, where it has always been low.
Figures shown for Taiwan in Table 4 reveal a greater disparity between the mean and effective number of candidates than for any election in Japan, reflecting a large number of also-ran candidates garnering minuscule vote shares. Since 2008 was the first election in Taiwan conducted under the mixed parallel system, small parties could not infer from past results when estimating their level of support in each district. Even so, the bipolarizing logic of FPTP in SMDs should have convinced most small party (and independent) candidates that they stood little chance of winning. Once again, with regard to the effective number of SMD candidates, movement 30. The 100 most densely populated SMDs are classified as urban; the next 100, mixed; and the most sparsely populated 100 districts are labeled rural. toward the anticipated equilibrium of 2.0 has proceeded at a much faster pace in Taiwan than in Japan.
Cross-District Linkage reaching this equilibrium indicates bipolar competition at the district level, but it does not necessarily mean that the same two parties are competitive across a given country. It is possible that two parties vying for SMDs in one part of the country only play insignificant roles in other regions. Keeping in mind that Duverger's mechanical and psychological effects strictly apply only at the district level, Cox cautions that "there is nothing in the original district-level logic (regarding either strategic voting or strategic entry) that allows one to conclude that there will be two parties nationally." 31 Thus, the causal arrow could be drawn not only from electoral system to patterns of party competition but also in the reverse direction.
To examine whether the process of cross-district linkage (i.e., competition across all districts featuring the same parties) is taking place, the first question is whether the two leading national parties nominate candidates across the entire country. Failure to do so may indicate weakness in organization or inability to find suitable standard bearers in certain districts, thus permitting minor parties or independents to enter Parliament via SMDs. The first column of Table 5 shows the number of SMDs without official nominees from the two leading parties at each election. Since large governing parties often arrange electoral pacts with smaller parties, and refrain from contesting some SMDs to allow the latter a clear run, figures in parentheses indicate the number of districts without any official government candidate. The weakness of the main opposition party in Japan (NFP in 1996, DPJ thereafter) in the first few elections under the new system is striking. The party left about one-fifth of all SMDs uncontested, although one sees the DPJ gradually closing the gap with the LDP-led governing coalition. This strengthening of the main opposition party into a nationally viable contender presents evidence of increasing cross-district linkage and fulfills a precondition for the development of a two-party system. In Taiwan, both large parties were present in most SMDs.
Competitiveness of Top Two National Parties' SMD Candidates
Nominating candidates does not guarantee a credible performance in district contests, however, and one cannot speak of a nationwide two-party system if one or both main parties remain no more than a token presence in many districts. To explore the strength of large parties in SMD races, the last columns in Table 5 display the number of seats where the top two vote getters were official nominees of the two leading parties nationwide.
32 Taking the aforementioned electoral arrangements into account, figures in parentheses show the number of districts where the candidates representing the governing coalition and the main opposition party finished in first and second places (irrespective of which ended up as winner). As in column 1, a clear trend emerges in Japan, as the percentage of SMDs featuring competition between nominees from the top two national parties rose steadily from 1996 to 2005. The most recent election involved a minor LDP split, and a number of ex-LDP MPs ran and retained their seats as independents. Because they have been readmitted to the party and will seek reelection under the LDP banner, one can expect the figure in this column to increase further in the next election.
Whereas the process of two-party system consolidation in Japan is taking place only gradually, bipolar competition in Taiwan appears to have been entrenched by the time the new system came into operation. As Table 5 shows, candidates from both major parties dominated most SMD races. This is less surprising on the side of the leading party and its allies, but the second largest party has mounted a more serious challenge for the reins of power than any opposition party in Japan has been able to do so far. 33 By this measure also, one can conclude that Taiwan has advanced further toward a consolidated two-party system than Japan.
Minor Party and Independent Candidates
According to Duverger's law, both the mechanical and psychological effects of FPTP should lead to two-party competition in SMDs, because small parties are squeezed by a bipolarizing logic. The aforementioned contamination effect offers small parties a rationale to nominate SMD candidates nonetheless, but only for the purpose of improving their Pr vote shares. This prompts reed's forecast about the impact of the new electoral system in Japan that "the Pr tier will not be able to rescue many, if any, small parties from the powerful incentives toward two-candidate competition in the single-member districts."
34 Independent candidates are also not expected to fare well under the new system because they face the pressure toward bipolar competition without the potential safety net of Pr lists. Table 6 shows the number of SMDs secured by minor parties (i.e., other than the two leading national contenders) and independents since the implementation of the new system, with figures in parentheses indicating the number of seats won by small parties not belonging to electoral pacts with any large party. 35 The two sets of figures follow divergent trends in Japan: while small parties (at least those outside the governing coalition) become less able to cling to districts, independent candidates continue to thrive. 36 In many districts won by independents, the main opposition party was too weak to be a factor, leaving the battle to be fought between the LDP and one unaffiliated candidate. 37 In striking contrast to Japan, small 33. For the purpose of this discussion, the KMT is considered the leading party in Taiwan despite having lost two consecutive presidential elections, because the party and its allies commanded a legislative majority.
34. reed, "Evaluating Political reform," p. 260. 35. Even though the LDP was governing in coalition with the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and the New Harbinger Party (NHP) at the time of the 1996 election, the LDP ran candidates in three of the four SMDs won by the SDPJ, and one SMD where the NHP won. These two junior partners also nominated candidates in several other districts in direct competition with the LDP. The Taiwanese election of 2008 saw two SMDs where the KMT and an allied party (the Non-Partisan Solidarity Association in one case, the People First Party in the other) were vying for the top spot, leaving the DPP far behind.
36. This does not necessarily contradict Duverger's law, which only hypothesizes the emergence of two leading candidates as a consequence of FPTP without stipulating that these contenders must come from the two largest parties nationwide.
37. Because more than half of independent victories in 2005 are attributable to former LDP MPs running without a party label after being denied official nominations, one can parties in Taiwan stood no chance of winning district races even in the first election under the new system. This is not for lack of trying, as evidenced by the relatively high average number of candidates per district shown in Table 2 .
Volatility
Another indicator of party system consolidation can be found in declining levels of inter-party volatility. One may see the party system in a state of flux in the immediate aftermath of electoral reform, as political elites and entrepreneurs try to assess the potential impact of new rules of the game in deciding whether to enter or exit the electoral market, while voters face the disappearance of some familiar party labels and the emergence of novel choices. As the party system approaches equilibrium, however, more voters should form stable preferences as parties no longer surface and vanish at each election, leading to lower volatility. Note that this holds true for the stabilization of any system regardless of the number of parties at equilibrium.
The first column of Table 7 shows volatility between each pair of elections since the last polls conducted under SNTv, 38 as indicated by the expect fewer independent wins in the next election because all but one of these MPs have been readmitted to the party. 38. Party vote shares under the mixed parallel system refer to vote percentage in Pr blocs. This gives a more accurate measure of actual levels of party support among the electorate, since voters have greater incentive to cast sincere ballots and have a fuller range of choices when voting for party lists (most small parties do not nominate candidates in all SMDs). Pedersen index. 39 The high values seen between most elections imply considerable fluctuations in parties' vote shares, especially in Japan from 1993 to 1996, when nearly half of all voters switched from one party to another. In this case, as in the two subsequent periods, one can probably attribute the fluctuating figures as much to party system reconfiguration as weak voter attachments. A flurry of small-and medium-sized new parties appeared before the 1993 elections, but many merged, forming the NFP, before the next polls in order to mount a credible challenge to the LDP in SMD contests. These frequent party name changes artificially inflate volatility, since parties that contested the 1993 election separately but later amalgamated are treated as having a 0% vote share in 1996. Taking this into account, figures given in the second column of Table 7 adjust for cases where a predecessor or successor party is clearly identifiable, offering a more accurate measure of volatility.
Both columns reveal a steady decline in volatility in Japan. The still-high figure for the 1993-96 period is attributable in part to the newly established DPJ. Although it was founded by former members of the SDPJ and the NHP, the latter two still contested the 1996 polls, so the DPJ's vote share can only be treated as having risen from 0% to 16%. The breakup of the NFP in 1997 and the DPJ-Liberal Party merger prior to the 2003 election largely explain figures for the two subsequent periods. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to trace the rise and fall of individual parties, even the brief sketch offered here suffices to capture the frequency of entrances to, and exits from, the electoral market in the decade following electoral reform. Alongside falling volatility, the fact that the 2005 election was the first time no major party mergers or splits occurred (though two tiny splinter parties were founded by a few renegade LDP politicians) testifies to party system stabilization.
The adjusted volatility figure for Taiwan is no easier to calculate, partly because the country does not have a parliamentary system of government, so there are no formal coalitions formed to maintain a legislative majority. Nevertheless, the KMT concluded electoral pacts with the PFP and the New Party in 2008, going as far as accepting candidates from these small parties to run under its banner. An informal agreement between the KMT and a party called the Non-Partisan Solidarity Association was also evident, as the latter was given a free run in head-to-head confrontations with DPP candidates in several districts. The higher figure in column one of Table 7 is largely attributable to the change in PFP vote share from 15% in 2004 to 0% in 2008 (and a corresponding increase in KMT support) because the PFP did not present a Pr list. Treating all parties cited above as a single bloc in 2004, and combining the DPP vote with that of the Taiwan Solidarity Union as another bloc, led to the considerably lower figure shown in the second column. 40 In the case of Taiwan, one can speak of the first column as displaying total volatility, while the second column represents inter-bloc volatility. The latter suggests that Taiwan has already attained party system equilibrium.
Explaining Differences in Trends toward a Two-Party System
Despite similar electoral rules under both the old SNTv and new parallel mixed system, party systems in Japan and Taiwan show divergent postreform trajectories, or at least variations in the speed and extent of convergence toward bipolar competition. Several explanations are explored below, including social cleavages, constitutional structures, inconsistencies between national and local electoral rules, and features under the new electoral 40 . If one does not count the Non-Partisan Solidarity Association as a part of the KMTled bloc, adjusted volatility would be 9.0. rules adopted by each country, to explain why Taiwan has moved faster and farther toward a two-party system than Japan.
Parties rise into prominence or fade into oblivion not only in reaction to electoral incentives but also in response to historically shaped societal cleavages. 41 From the early post-war period, political debate in Japan had revolved around non-economic questions such as the role of the emperor and the military, the form of political structure, and the choice of foreign alliances. richardson et al. state that "these cultural political issues, to a great extent, defined electoral alignments and the postwar party system," not least because other cleavages (regional, religious, class) lacked salience. 42 Economic issues were also of secondary importance in Taiwan, where the question of national identity dominated post-democratization party politics. 43 Although one may anticipate that the existence of a single principal cleavage leads to a two-party system, the emergence of the Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito in Japan and the New Party, Taiwan Solidarity Union, and PFP in Taiwan casts doubt on this hypothesis.
Competition between the LDP and DPJ today is generally not organized around "cultural" cleavages, partly because the end of the Cold War rendered some conflicts obsolete, and also because of a degree of consensus on important issues between these two parties. However, these issues (e.g., constitutional revision) may still provide a raison d'être for smaller parties such as the SDPJ and JCP. In contrast, the national identity question in Taiwan continues to underpin competition between the KMT and DPP. yet in view of the aforementioned smaller parties in Taiwan being able to enter the political arena and attract significant vote shares during the decade preceding electoral reform, one cannot conclude that social cleavages constitute the main influence on party system development. Whether these parties represent constituencies aligned along different issue dimensions, or simply occupy niches on both extremes of the national identity spectrum, the fact that contours of the party system changed while cleavage patterns remained the same demands alternative explanations.
That presidential regimes produce a smaller number of parties than parliamentary systems has been noted both theoretically and empirically by many scholars. 44 Because the presidency is a unitary position, the same logic behind Duverger's mechanical and psychological effects in SMDs is applicable, in this case at the national level. Furthermore, within presidential regimes, two-party systems are most likely when the president is elected by plurality (rather than majority run-off), and the concurrence of presidential and legislative elections also reduces the number of parties. 45 The presidential system in Taiwan today conforms to both of these criteria, so one may argue that differences between Japan's and Taiwan's evolution toward bipolar competition are rooted in contrasting constitutional structures.
yet while it is plausible to assert that Taiwan has a more full-fledged twoparty system than Japan because of the electoral imperative of presidential elections, this is only a static description of the current state of affairs. A dynamic view reveals that ENP in Taiwan, at both the elective and parliamentary levels, increased from the late 1990s to the early 2000s (see Table  2 ), notwithstanding conditions governing presidential contests remaining constant from 1996 to 2004 (plurality of popular vote, non-concurrence with legislative polls). The only significant change in 2008 was election timing, namely, the near concurrence of presidential and legislative elections after legislative terms were extended from three to four years. But one cannot count on a "coattail" effect, because MPs were elected before the president. 46 Even if nearly concurrent elections in Taiwan account for the sharp drop in ENP from 2004 to 2008, emphasis on relatively stable constitutional structures cannot explain dynamic party system shifts in Japan and during the pre-reform decade in Taiwan. 46. Nearly concurrent elections are now scheduled to take place every four years. Lin predicts that "a two-person presidential race is likely to overshadow the legislative election and to make it hard for smaller parties to make their voices heard" (Lin, "The Politics of reform in Japan and Taiwan," p. 129).
A number of recent studies on party system change in Japan focus on inconsistencies between electoral rules for national and sub-national legislatures in explaining the continued presence of more than two major candidates at the district level. Whereas SMD candidates are elected by plurality, SNTv is still used for prefectural and local assembly elections, resulting in what Horiuchi and Natori label a "vertical contamination effect": SMD candidates often rely on local politicians for campaign mobilization (a relationship known as keiretsu), yet while FPTP creates centripetal incentives, SNTv generates centrifugal pressure. 47 Where a national (single-member) district geographically overlaps with multiple local districts, the difference in electoral rules affects the effective number of candidates per SMD. In short, inconsistent electoral rules impede the development of a two-party system by inhibiting bipolar competition at the district level through contrary incentive structures.
An examination of these inconsistent rules offers important insights into the previously neglected association between local and national electoral dynamics in unitary states. The validity of this analysis can also be extended to the case of Taiwan, where local factions play an important role in national elections.
48 yet precisely because the inconsistent rules in Japan and Taiwan are similar, they cannot explain divergences in the two countries' evolution toward a two-party system. The puzzle of why vertical contamination has not deterred or at least delayed the emergence of bipolar competition in Taiwan lies outside the scope of this study; here it suffices to stress that one must seek other explanations to account for differences in post-reform party system development between Japan and Taiwan.
Although the mechanisms translating votes into seats under both SNTv and the mixed parallel system are largely similar in Japan and Taiwan, it is important not to overlook differences in a number of provisions. Focusing on the post-reform system, these include the design of Pr blocs, the possibility of dual candidacies, and the relative distribution of parliamentary seats allocated by SMD and Pr, in addition to different thresholds already described. The Japanese system allocates Pr seats by regional blocs, permits candidates to run in both SMD and Pr components, and reserves a higher proportion of parliamentary seats for members elected through Pr compared with Taiwan. The impact of the first factor on facilitating a 47. yusaku Horiuchi and ryota Natori, "vertical Contamination Effects on the Duvergerian Equilibrium: The Case of Japan," typescript, Australian National University, 2007, available at <http://www.horiuchi.org/files/sines.pdf>.
48. For example, see Shelly rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy (London: routledge, 1999).
two-party system is ambiguous, while the latter two may account for the more rapid decline of small parties in Taiwan.
One consequence deriving from the distinction between regional and nationwide Pr districts is that the former allow (particularly major) parties to gain representation in areas where they are not sufficiently strong to win SMD contests. While this may not have a direct impact on parliamentary seat distribution, it increases the likelihood of parties establishing footholds in electorally weak regions that may serve as bases for future expansion. Consequently, "the Pr tier may actually enhance the tendency of SMDs to produce two-candidate competition by reducing the number of noncompetitive districts." 49 In contrast, candidates running on a nationwide Pr list probably have reason to appeal to the electorate on the basis of policy preferences or sectoral group interests rather than cultivate areaspecific ties. As a consequence, even a major party may have both lesser incentive and fewer opportunities to strengthen its support in regions where it is traditionally weak.
Another important difference between the new systems adopted in Japan and Taiwan is the possibility of dual candidacy in the former. Moreover, candidates who are simultaneously nominated to both tiers may be ranked equally on their parties' Pr list. The position of equally ranked candidates on the Pr list who lose their SMD races is determined by the ratio of their SMD vote to the district winners' vote (sekihairitsu); those whose vote share comes closest to that of SMD winners have a better chance of gaining seats through the Pr tier. voters in Japan thus have an incentive to cast a sincere vote not only in Pr but also in the SMD portion (if the contest is not too lopsided), because even if their preferred candidate does not win the district race, he or she may still become an MP thanks to a high sekihairitsu. 50 In contrast, Taiwanese voters faced with a similar scenario may be more inclined to vote tactically in SMD contests, or not turn out at all, in the knowledge that sincere voting would serve no utilitarian purpose.
One should note that seats allocated by Pr comprise only 37.5% (reduced from 40%) of total seats in the Japanese House of representatives, and approximately 30% in the Taiwanese Legislative yuan. Because most small parties cannot hope to win many SMD contests and depend on Pr lists for parliamentary survival, the lower the percentage of Pr seats in the composition of the legislature, the more likely small parties will find themselves discriminated against by the electoral system. Furthermore, overall legislature size also affects small parties' chances, although in the case of Taiwan small party failure is more attributable to the 5% threshold than to the truncated size of Parliament (reduced from 225 to 113 seats with the enactment of electoral reform).
Discussions and Conclusions
This study has compared trends in patterns of party competition in Japan and Taiwan following the change from SNTv to a mixed parallel system, and examined alternative theories explaining why Taiwan has moved faster and farther than Japan toward bipolar competition. Tracing the evolution in effective number of parties and disproportionality highlights macro-level changes in the party system consequent upon electoral reform, while detailing variations in individual districts over the course of several elections provides evidence of movement toward a two-party system. Finally, volatility figures reveal the degree of party system stabilization. The phenomena of continued decline in the ENP (particularly in the SMD component) and increase in disproportionality together corroborate prognostications derived from the literature. Trends toward bipolar competition and greater cross-district linkage by both leading national parties are also largely in line with the expectations of electoral reform advocates and academic experts alike.
A variety of indicators all point to the emergence of a two-party system in both Japan and Taiwan, though neither at the same speed nor to the same extent. Four explanations are offered to account for these differences: social cleavages, constitutional structures, inconsistencies between national and sub-national electoral rules, and features of the new system that set the two cases apart. Most of these hypotheses offer valid elucidations of developments in one country or in both comparatively at a given point in time, but perform less well in illuminating cross-national and cross-temporal distinctions. The implementation of concurrent presidential and legislative elections, the unavailability of a dual candidacy provision, and the smaller legislature size (coupled with a 5% threshold) in Taiwan all function as constraints on small party survival, and hence accelerate movement toward two-party competition. A presidential system and persistent unidimensional cleavage may also be contributory factors, although they cannot explain the rise of small parties during the years preceding electoral reform.
Before drawing conclusions about the decisive, even deterministic, function of institutional rules in dictating party system development, however, two general and one specific reminders are in order. First, the introduction of electoral reform takes place within particular political AS4905_02_Jou.indd 783 10/13/09 4:50:02 PM contexts, with each actor (not only parties but also individual politicians) taking its own interests into consideration when devising new institutional rules. Not surprisingly, large parties prefer plurality rules while small parties without geographically concentrated support favor Pr. Accordingly, the higher number of both total and effective parliamentary parties in Japan when electoral reform was passed influenced the introduction of the new system in a more proportional direction than that devised by a less fragmented legislature in Taiwan. In fact, electoral reform might not have passed at all without splits within the LDP leading to greater legislative fragmentation and power alternation. In short, not only can electoral reform influence party system change, the causal arrow may also point in the opposite direction. On a related note, the extent of party system change brought about by electoral reform can be analyzed not merely by observing trends in the number of parties and their relative strength but also by examining strategies individual parties adopt in response to new rules of the game. The preceding section mentions several examples of electoral pacts and government coalitions as parties react to the logic generated by the new system. This potentially leads to centripetal competition concomitant with the development of a two-party system because parties now have an incentive to court the median voter rather than cultivate niches of minority support. 51 Even if small parties manage to survive under the new system, they may become dependent on one of the large parties, resulting in what may be labeled a twocamp system. recent developments in Japan offer some evidence affirming this development, with the LDP-Komeito coalition on one side versus DPJ and all other small parties (bar the communists) in the opposite camp.
Lastly, having seen that the 1996 election in Japan did not necessarily portend trends in party competition in subsequent polls, caution is necessary when making predictions about Taiwan's party system based on results from a single election. At the same time, one has reason to believe that unlike Japan, the party system in Taiwan will not be in flux; it was not as fragmented as Japan's when the new system was adopted, and all indicators above show that Taiwan may have already reached the equilibrium of a full-fledged twoparty system. Just one election is sufficient to prove that small parties have minimum space for survival under the current system, so political entrepreneurs (including dissidents within large parties) have an incentive to advance their careers and policy objectives through one of the two existing parties rather than establishing new ones.
While intra-party conflict and parliamentary fragmentation were by no means the only problems electoral reform advocates proposed to addressother perceived deleterious corollaries of SNTv include corruption, 51. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New york: Harper, 1957).
AS4905_02_Jou.indd 784 10/13/09 4:50:02 PM factionalism, and non-policy-centered campaigns-the area where one could expect the introduction of the mixed parallel system to exert the most direct and immediate impact involves patterns of party competition. The development and stabilization of a nationwide two-party system in both Japan and Taiwan in place of a multi-polar one demonstrate the crucial influence of institutional design on the behaviors of both parties and voters. At the same time, differences in the pace and extent of evolution toward such an equilibrium caution against conclusions based on singular explanations. Contextual factors such as social cleavages and the degree of legislative fragmentation; structural factors such as constitutional design and consistency between mechanisms for selecting national and sub-national representatives; as well as details of electoral rules such as legal and effective thresholds for party lists, the percentage of seats allocated by Pr, and the size of Pr district(s) can all play a significant role in shaping party systems' evolution following electoral reform.
